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Abstract 
Can a World Trade Organization (WTO) Member exclude an invention from patentability on 
the grounds of ordre public or morality whilst at the same time permitting the sale and 
distribution of the invention within its territory? This is a question raised by recent 
developments in Europe, where moral restrictions have been placed on the patentability of 
‘uses of human embryos’, yet human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research, which involves 
the destruction of human embryos, is permitted and encouraged within numerous EU 
Member States, and indeed, also funded through the central EU science budget. This chapter 
assesses whether such an incoherent regulatory landscape would survive WTO scrutiny. The 
chapter argues that in general, if a WTO Member has not attempted to ban the commercial 
exploitation of a certain invention within its borders, measures prohibiting the patenting of 
that invention on moral grounds would likely be viewed as constituting an unjustified 
restriction on international trade. More concretely, it is suggested that the WTO Member 
would be found to be in violation of its obligation under the TRIPS Agreement to make 
patents available without ‘discrimination’ as to the field of technology.   
 
Keywords 
TRIPS Agreement, patent, morality, moral exception, human embryo, international trade, 
WTO. 
 1 
Introduction1 
 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is a 
multilateral agreement on intellectual property that was concluded in 1994 as part of the 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2 According to its 
preamble, the TRIPS Agreement reflects the desire amongst WTO Members: 
 
[T]o reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, and … to promote effective 
and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and 
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to 
legitimate trade. 
 
In order to achieve its stated goal of enhanced trade liberalisation, TRIPS imposes an 
obligation on all WTO Members3 to provide minimum standards of intellectual property (IP) 
protection. Members must make available and enforce a range of intellectual property rights 
(IPRs), including copyright, patents, trademarks, industrial designs and geographical 
indications, without discrimination as to the nationality of the right holder. TRIPS is 
administered by the WTO, and disputes between WTO Members concerning the 
interpretation of TRIPS and its implementation in national laws are subject to the WTO 
dispute settlement system.4  
    Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement establishes a basic requirement on WTO Members to 
make patents ‘available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application’. It further adds that ‘patents shall be available and patent rights 
enjoyable without discrimination as to the … field of technology’. Article 27.2 of TRIPS, 
however, provides a limited exception to Article 27.1 which states that: 
 
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of 
the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, 
including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to 
the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation 
is prohibited by their law.  
 
Both the wording and the underlying policy objectives of the TRIPS morality exception are 
somewhat ambiguous and obscure. Unsurprisingly, this has led to a lack of clarity and 
agreement over the precise conditions under which a WTO Member may rely on an Article 
27.2 defence to justify derogation from its core obligations under Article 27.1. A low-
intensity academic debate on this question has seen opinion split broadly into four views.  
  One group of commentators suggests that a WTO Member must first prohibit the 
commercial exploitation of an invention within its territory before it is entitled to exclude the 
invention from patentability on moral grounds.5 A second group takes the diametrically 
                                                
1 The author would like to thank Dr James Harrison at the School of Law, University of Edinburgh, for helpful 
guidance and advice on this paper. Any mistakes or omissions are the sole responsibility of the author.  
2 For a detailed discussion see D Gervais The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 2nd edn (Sweet 
& Maxwell 2003). For an overview of the structure of the WTO Agreements and all the WTO legal texts 
including the TRIPS Agreement, see: 
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm>.  
3 As of May 2009, 153 in total. 
4 For a summary of the Dispute Settlement System, see: 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm>.  
5 P Van Den Bossche The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, 2nd edn 
(Cambridge University Press 2008) 785.  
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opposed view that the wording of Article 27.2 only requires the decision of a competent 
authority (such as a legislative body or perhaps an individual patent examiner) that a ban is 
necessary to protect morality, but does not impose any legal requirement for the Member to 
also take positive steps to prohibit the actual commercial exploitation of the invention.6 
According to the third view, meanwhile, the interpretation of Article 27.2 would be 
influenced by the ‘morality jurisprudence’ of the European Patent Office (EPO) that has been 
built up in relation to Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention (EPC).7 Finally, the 
fourth group suggests that when reviewing a WTO Member’s decision to exclude inventions 
from patentability in order to protect ordre public or morality, a WTO panel or the Appellate 
Body would apply the ‘necessity test’ used to scrutinise measures adopted under the 
‘exceptions clauses’ found in other WTO Agreements; namely Article XX of GATT and also 
Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).8   
    Until recently, the interpretation of Article 27.2 has been a question of little practical 
importance and of only marginal academic interest. The provision has lain entirely dormant, 
as there have been no disputes in which a WTO panel or the Appellate Body has been called 
upon to clarify its scope and contents. However, the recent ‘moral turn’ in European 
biotechnology patent law that has resulted in moral limitations being placed on the 
patentability of hESC-related technology, yet without accompanying prohibitions on the 
production and sale of such inventions throughout the EU, has arguably increased the 
significance of Article 27.2 for international trade and heightened the need for a clearer sense 
of the contours of this rule.9  
    Conceivably, Article 27.2 could be used to attempt to justify arbitrary and irrational 
decisions regarding the patentability of inventions. It could also be used more cynically to 
mask protectionism and ‘free-riding’. A WTO Member could, for instance, reject the 
patentability of certain biotechnological or pharmaceutical inventions developed in other 
countries under the pretext of moral objections, but then copy and manufacture the invention 
itself or allow its domestic manufacturers to do so. This would disadvantage foreign 
companies who would otherwise enjoy patent protection and market exclusivity.10 It can 
therefore be surmised that without any kind of WTO scrutiny over measures adopted under 
Article 27.2, the TRIPS morality provision could well become the exception that swallows 
the rule of Article 27.1. 
                                                
6 D Leskien and M Flitner ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic Resources: Options for a Sui Generis 
System’, (1997) International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, Issues in Genetic Resources No. 6, Rome. 
Available at: <http://www.bioversityinternational.org/publications/Pdf/497.pdf>. 
7 Suggested in N Pires de Carvalho The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights, (Kluwer Law International 2002) 170–
171. 
8 D Gervais The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 223. Also discussed in C Henckels ‘The 
Ostensible Flexibilities in TRIPS: Can Essential Pharmaceuticals Be Excluded from Patentability in Public 
Health Crises?’ (2006) 32 Monash U L Rev 335-356 at 348–351.  
9 A detailed background discussion of the patentability of hESC-related inventions in Europe and the regulatory 
regimes for hESC research in individual EU countries is beyond the scope of this paper. Readers are referred to 
the other chapters in this volume, and also: A Plomer et al. ‘Stem Cell Patents: European Law and Ethics', 
(2006) European Commission, available at: 
<http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/StemCellProject/project.report.pdf>; A Plomer, K S Taymor and C Thomas 
Scott ‘Challenges to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Patents’ (2008) 2 Cell Stem Cell 13–17; R Fitt ‘New 
Guidance on the Patentability of Embryonic Stem Cell Patents in Europe’ (2009) 27 Nature Biotechnology 318–
319; ‘EU to Fund Embryo Cell Research’ BBC News (24 July 2006) available at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5209106.stm>; A Elstner et al. ‘The Changing Landscape of European 
and International Regulation on Embryonic Stem Cell Research’ (2009) 2 Stem Cell Research 101–107. 
10 A discussion of the policy arguments for and against the use of Article 27.2 in this manner from the 
perspectives of international development and the right to health is outside the scope of this paper. See generally 
‘Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy’ Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
(London 2002). Available at: <http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm>. 
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     This chapter is divided into two parts. Part A presents the divergent academic views on the 
scope and contents of Article 27.2 of TRIPS and also briefly reviews the jurisprudence on the 
interpretation of morality-based exceptions in WTO Agreements. Part B sets out the 
principles of treaty interpretation that would be applied to Article 27.2 and then suggests the 
interpretative approach that a WTO panel or the Appellate Body might adopt when 
attempting to flesh out the meaning of this vaguely worded provision.  
 
A: Divergent views on the TRIPS morality exception 
 
Academic opinion is divided over the question of how Article 27.2 should be interpreted. A 
survey of the literature reveals four distinct views: 
 
(1) The ‘necessity of a ban on commercial exploitation’ view  
 
Can the TRIPS Article 27.2 exception be applied while at the same time allowing the 
distribution or sale of the invention, or is there is a need for an actual ban on the ‘commercial 
exploitation’ of the invention itself? According to the first view, an effective ban must be in 
place in order to justify invoking the exception. Van Den Bossche, for example, asserts that: 
 
The link between the use of the exception and the prevention of commercial exploitation of 
the invention in the territory of the Member aims to ensure that this exception is not used to 
deny patent protection to an invention on public order or morality grounds, while the 
invention itself is in fact commercially exploited in the Member.11 
 
This view has much to commend it. The test it sets out is simple and straightforward; 
requiring merely a reasonable degree of consistency between the standards of ordre public or 
morality expressed within a WTO Member’s patent laws and those expressed within the 
Member’s domestic regulations governing the sale and distribution of particular inventions. 
This approach also coheres with a key principle running through the entire WTO compact, 
i.e. that deviations from WTO obligations should not be made lightly.12  
 
(2) The ‘prohibition of commercial exploitation is not necessary’ view 
 
Other commentators disagree with the above position. On its wording, Article 27.2 only 
points to the ‘necessity’ of such a ban, and does not state in definitive terms that a prohibition 
must be in place.13 Leskien and Flitner therefore suggest a second view, arguing that TRIPS: 
 
[D]oes not require an actual ban on the commercialization as a condition for exclusions; 
only the necessity to prevent—by whatever means—the commercial exploitation of the 
invention. Yet the member state would not have to prove that under its national laws the 
commercialization of the invention was or is actually prohibited.14  
 
Leskien and Flitner also assert that the inclusion of the final phrase in Article 27.2 (‘provided 
that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by domestic 
                                                
11 P Van Den Bossche The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, 785. 
12 Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services (US—Gambling), WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted 20 April 2005),  para. 308. 
13 CM Correa Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement 
(Oxford University Press 2007), 291. 
14 D Leskien and M Flitner ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic Resources: Options for a Sui Generis 
System’ 15.  
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law’) lends additional weight to the view that an effective ban is not a necessary condition for 
the denial of patents:  
 
This qualification makes clear that the assessment of whether or not the commercialization 
of a particular invention is necessary in order to protect ordre public or morality does not 
depend on any national laws. Conversely and by the same token, a particular invention may 
be excluded from patentability although its commercialization is (still) permitted under a 
member state's national laws.15 
 
Further support for this overall argument lies in the fact that if the drafters of TRIPS had 
intended a ban on the commercial exploitation of the invention to be a precondition for 
reliance on Article 27.2, different language could have been used to reflect that policy 
objective. As the framers of Article 27.2 chose deliberately not to use a format such as: 
‘Members may exclude from patentability, the commercial exploitation of which has been 
prevented in their territory in order to protect ordre public or morality…’, it can be suggested 
that a ban on the commercial exploitation of the invention was intended, at best, to be merely 
one way in which a WTO Member could demonstrate the necessity of the prevention of the 
commercial exploitation of the invention, but that a ban is by no means required by a strict 
construction of the text of Article 27.2 itself. 
 
(3) The ‘EPO morality jurisprudence’ view 
 
A third view is to suggest that because the TRIPS Agreement borrowed the term ‘ordre 
public or morality’ from the EPC, the interpretation of Article 27.2 may be influenced by the 
case law of the EPO in relation to how this phrase, found in Article 53(a) EPC, has been 
understood.16 In general, the EPO has applied Article 53(a) in a restrictive manner. Of the 
numerous biotechnology patent applications in which the morality of the invention has been 
questioned,17 only one patent application—for a genetically engineered hairless mouse that 
could be used to assist research into treatments for baldness18—has been held to contravene 
Article 53(a) EPC. The exact legal tests that have been used by the EPO have varied from 
case to case, with references to, inter alia; a weighing and balancing of the harms and 
benefits of the commercial exploitation of the invention,19 the ‘standards of morality inherent 
in European society and civilisation’20 and ‘public abhorrence’.21 Importantly, none of these 
tests require the exclusion of patentability to be tied to a ban on the commercial exploitation 
of the invention. 
                                                
15 Ibid, 15–16. 
16 Suggested in N Pires de Carvalho The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights, 170–171. Article 53(a) EPC 2000 
states that: ‘European patents shall not be granted in respect of: (a) inventions the commercial exploitation of 
which would be contrary to “ordre public” or morality; such exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary 
merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States’. This is a change in 
wording from Article 53(a) EPC 1973, which provides that: “European patents shall not be granted in respect of: 
(a) inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to “ordre public” or morality, provided 
that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in 
some or all of the Contracting States” (emphasis added). 
17 For an overview and commentary, see A Warren-Jones ‘Vital Parameters for Patent Morality: A Question of 
Form’ (2007) 2(12) JIPLP 832–846. 
18 Upjohn’s Application (Hairless Mouse) [1991] EP 89 913 146.0 (unreported). The Examining Division held 
that the invention violated Article 53(a) EPC on the grounds that ‘[h]air growth and wool production are not 
connected with any kind of serious threat to human being’.  
19 Harvard/Oncomouse [1990] OJ EPO 476. 
20 Plant Genetic Systems [1995] EPOR 357. 
21 Howard Florey/H2 Relaxin [1995] EPOR 541. 
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    In support of the assertion that the interpretation of Article 27.2 should follow the EPO’s 
approach to Article 53(a) EPC, it can be argued that this would allow the WTO to strike an 
appropriate balance between the competing goals of the liberalisation of trade and respect for 
IPRs on the one hand, with the need to afford a degree of discretion to WTO Members to 
pursue overriding policy goals by prohibiting, in extreme cases, the patentability of certain 
inventions on moral grounds.  
 
(4) The ‘WTO jurisprudence on exceptions’ view  
 
The fourth approach that has been suggested is that the interpretation of TRIPS Article 27.2 
should follow the WTO jurisprudence on the interpretation of the ‘general exceptions 
clauses’ found in other WTO Agreements, such as Article XX of GATT and Article XIV of 
GATS.22 GATT and GATS are multilateral agreements that set out the basic rules for 
international trade in goods and services respectively. Both agreements aim to eliminate 
barriers to trade through the establishment of a non-discriminatory trading system. WTO 
Members are obliged to respect, inter alia, the principles of national treatment (NT) and 
most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment in relation to measures affecting trade in goods and 
services. Notwithstanding this commitment to trade liberalisation, the inclusion of general 
exceptions clauses in both instruments provides a degree of scope for Members wishing to 
justify the exclusion of certain products or services from their territory for a variety of 
domestic policy reasons. GATT Article XX, which reads as follows, can be 
compartmentalised into two sections; the enumerated exceptions and the introductory 
paragraph or ‘chapeau’: 
 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting 
party of measures:  
 
(a)        necessary to protect public morals;  
(b)        necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;  
 
GATS Article XIV(a) reflects the language of GATT Article XX(a).23 Although there is as 
yet no case law dealing with the GATT Article XX(a) ‘morality exception’,24 this provision 
has been relied upon by WTO Members to justify import bans on an array of products, 
including ‘obscene and subversive literature’, ‘horror comics’, alcoholic beverages, the Holy 
Quran, foodstuffs containing animal blood in their manufacturing and live swine and 
products of swine.25 The GATT public morals exception could also conceivably be relied 
                                                
22 D Gervais The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 223. 
23 Article XIV(a) also provides an additional category of ‘public order’. GATS Art. XIV(a), fn 5 states that: 
‘The public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one 
of the fundamental interests of society’.  
24 For discussion see S Charnovitz ‘The Moral Exception in Trade Policy’ (1998) 38 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 689-745; M A Gonzalez ‘Trade and Morality: Preserving “Public Morals” Without 
Sacrificing the Global Economy’ (2006) 39 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 939-972; M Wu ‘Free 
Trade and the Protection of Public Morals: An Analysis of the Newly Emerging Public Morals Clause Doctrine’ 
(2008) 33 Yale Journal of International Law 215-251. 
25 P Van Den Bossche The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, 639–
640.  
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upon to justify import bans on items such as ‘blood diamonds’ and products made by child 
labour.26  
  The interpretation of the term ‘necessary’ within the meaning of GATT Article XX(a) is 
likely to follow the two-tier ‘necessity test’ developed in the case law relating to Article 
XX(b).27 This test has also been applied in the context of GATS. A clear illustration of how 
the test operates can be provided by the case of US—Gambling which is the only dispute to 
date that has involved the GATS Article XIV(a) ‘public morals’ clause.28  
    US—Gambling concerned complaints brought by Antigua against the United States for 
alleged GATS violations. Antigua asserted that a number of US federal and state laws which 
prohibit the remote supply of gambling and betting services, including Internet gambling, 
constituted a ban on the cross-border provision of Internet gambling services. The United 
States had argued that these measures were justified under Article XIV(a) because Internet 
gambling posed threats in relation to organised crime, money laundering and fraud; risks to 
children; and risks to health due to addiction to anonymous, 24-hour online gambling.  
    Under the first tier of the test, the Panel accepted that these concerns fell within the scope 
of the terms ‘public morals’ and ‘public order’ as set out in Article XIV(a).29 Following prior 
GATT Article XX(b) jurisprudence,30 the Panel then stated that in determining whether a 
measure is ‘necessary’ within the meaning of GATS Article XIV(a), it must ‘weigh and 
balance’ several factors, particularly the importance of the interests or values that the 
challenged measure is intended to protect,31 the extent to which the challenged measure 
contributes to the realisation of the end pursued,32 and the trade impact of the challenged 
measure.33 The Panel found that the challenged US measures failed the ‘necessity’ test.34 On 
                                                
26 Ibid. 
27 P Van Den Bossche, ibid, 640. 
28 Panel Report, US—Gambling, WT/DS285/R (circulated 10 November 2004), as modified by the Appellate 
Body Report, WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted 20 April 2005). For commentary see J C Marwell ‘Trade and 
Morality: The WTO Public Morals Exception after Gambling’ (2006) 81 New York University Law Review 
802-842; N F Diebold ‘The Morals and Order Exceptions in WTO Law: Balancing the Toothless Tiger and the 
Undermining Mole’ (2007) 11(1) Journal of International Economic Law 43-74. 
29 Panel Report, US—Gambling, para. 6.474. 
30 Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Beef (Korea—
Various Measures on Beef), WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted 10 January 2001); Appellate Body 
Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC—
Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted 5 April 2001). See J C Marwell ‘Trade and Morality: The WTO Public 
Morals Exception After Gambling’ at 813, arguing that the “exact mechanics of this balancing test are 
somewhat opaque”. For further critical commentary see D H Regan, ‘The Meaning of ‘Necessary in GATT 
Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing’ (2007) 6(3) World Trade Review 
347-369. 
31 Panel Report, US—Gambling, para. 6.477. With respect to this requirement, the Appellate Body has suggested 
that if the value or interest pursued is considered important it is more likely that the measure is ‘necessary’. See 
Appellate Body Report, Korea—Various Measures on Beef, para. 162. 
32 Panel Report, US—Gambling, para. 6.477. In relation to this requirement, the Appellate Body has suggested 
that the greater the extent to which the measure contributes to the end pursued, the more likely that the measure 
is ‘necessary’. See Appellate Body Report, Korea—Various Measures on Beef, para. 163. 
33 Panel Report, US—Gambling, para. 6.477. With regard to this requirement, the Appellate Body has said that if 
the measure has a relatively slight trade impact, the more likely the measure is ‘necessary’. The Appellate Body 
has also indicated that whether a reasonably available WTO-consistent alternative measure exists must be taken 
into consideration in applying this requirement. See Appellate Body Report, Korea—Various Measures on Beef, 
paras. 163 and 166. 
34 Panel Report, US—Gambling, para. 6.535. This was due to the restrictive impact of the challenged measures 
and because the United States had failed to engage in consultations with Antigua in order to attempt to find 
reasonably available, less-trade restrictive alternatives to legislative prohibitions on Internet gambling. 
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appeal, the Appellate Body reversed this aspect of the Panel’s decision, finding that the 
measures were ‘necessary’ within the meaning of GATS Article XIV(a).35  
    Under the second tier of the test, the Panel engaged in analysis under the chapeau of 
Article XIV, stating that in determining whether the application of the measures at issue 
constitutes ‘arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination’ or a ‘disguised restriction on trade’: 
 
[T]he absence of consistency in this regard may lead to a conclusion that the measures in 
question are applied in a manner that constitutes ‘arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination’ 
or a ‘disguised restriction on trade’.36 
 
When applied to the facts, the Panel in US—Gambling found that the United States had not 
been shown not to discriminate against foreign gambling service providers. This was because 
the United States had failed to prosecute certain domestic service providers and also because 
the Interstate Horseracing Act potentially authorised US companies to supply certain kinds of 
remote betting on horseracing in the United States whilst prohibiting foreign companies from 
engaging in the same activity.37 On appeal, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding 
that the US measures in question were discriminatory in their application.38  
    The two-tier necessity test developed and applied in relation to GATT Article XX(b) and 
GATS Article XIV(a) would offer two advantages as the framework for interpreting Article 
27.2 of TRIPS. First, it would enable a flexible legal test for resolving disputes between 
WTO Members in areas involving sensitive moral judgements. Second, this methodology 
would also allow dispute settlement procedures to draw from a well-developed seam of 
jurisprudence regarding the interpretation of exceptions in WTO Agreements. 
    But which, if any, of the above four interpretive approaches would be adopted by a WTO 
panel or the Appellate Body in relation to the TRIPS morality exception? As the text and 
meaning of Article 27.2 remain shrouded in ambiguities, the rules relating to the 
interpretation of provisions in WTO Agreements assume paramount importance. 
 
B: The interpretation of TRIPS Article 27.2 
 
(1) General principles of interpretation 
 
Although Article 3(2) of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)39 does not 
mention specifically the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties40 (the ‘Vienna 
Convention’), the WTO’s Appellate Body has made it clear that both Articles 31 and 32 of 
the Vienna Convention have attained the status of rules of customary or general international 
law that panels and the Appellate Body have been directed, under Article 3(2) of the DSU, to 
apply in seeking to clarify the provisions of the General Agreement and the other ‘covered 
                                                
35 Appellate Body Report, US—Gambling, para. 327. The Appellate Body rejected the Panel’s ‘necessity’ 
analysis on the grounds that consultations with Antigua would not in themselves constitute a reasonably 
available alternative measure.  
36 Panel Report, US—Gambling, para. 6.584. 
37 Panel Report, US—Gambling, para. 6.607. 
38 Appellate Body Report, US—Gambling, paras. 348-351.  
39 Article 3(2) of the DSU provides that: ‘The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in 
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to 
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing 
provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. 
Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the 
covered agreements’ (emphasis added). 
40 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, open for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 United Nations, Treaty 
Series 331 (entered into force on 27 January 1980).   
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agreements’ of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the 
‘WTO Agreement’).41 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides that: 
 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
 
The principle of ‘effective treaty interpretation’, which can be seen as the corollary of the rule 
that a treaty be interpreted in ‘good faith’, requires an interpreter to give effect to all the terms 
of a treaty and to avoid a reading of a provision that would result in reducing whole clauses 
or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.42 The Panel in US—Gambling also 
observed that: ‘the principle of good faith in the process of interpretation underlies the 
concept that interpretation should not lead to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable’.43   
    Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention further states that in addition to the context, 
account should be taken of any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions, as well as of any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention adds that recourse may be 
had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty 
and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to 
Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable. 
    There is no formal rule of stare decisis in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. The 
Appellate Body has nevertheless indicated that previous decisions ‘create legitimate 
expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they 
are relevant to any dispute’.44 Furthermore, although the TRIPS Agreement occupies a 
relatively self-contained, sui generis status in the WTO Agreement, it is nevertheless an 
integral part of the WTO system. The WTO panels or the Appellate Body could therefore 
refer to other WTO Agreements and their interpretation in prior decisions when interpreting 
Article 27.2 of TRIPS.45  
    In WTO dispute settlement proceedings, ‘exception clauses’ are invoked as a defence by a 
respondent WTO Member State after a complaining state has established a prima facie case 
that the respondent has violated a trade obligation.46 The Appellate Body has emphasised that 
exceptions are not necessarily construed in a deliberately narrow fashion so that a derogation 
does not erode core obligations, but rather by a ‘balanced’ interpretation of a particular 
                                                
41 Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (‘US—
Gasoline’), WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted 20 May 1996), 16; Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages (Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II), WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted 1 
November 1996), 9. 
42 Appellate Body Report, US—Gasoline, 21.  
43 Panel Report, US—Gambling para. 6.49.  
44 Appellate Body Report, Japan — Alcoholic Beverages II, 13.  
45 Panel Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products—Complaint 
by the United States (India—Patents (US)), WT/DS5O/R (adopted 5 September 1997), para. 7.19. See Olivier 
Cattaneo ‘The Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement: Considerations for the WTO Panels and the Appellate 
Body’ (2000) 3 The Journal of World Intellectual Property 627-681 at 668. 
46 Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Woollen Shirts and Blouses 
from India (US—Wool Shirts and Blouses), WT/DS33/AB/R (adopted 23 May 1997) 15-16; Appellate Body 
Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (EC—Hormones (Canada)), 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, (adopted 13 February 1998), paras. 98 and 104. 
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provision, given its text, context, object and purpose, and taking into account the often 
conflicting goals of the liberalisation of trade and the promotion of other societal values.47  
 
(2) Text 
 
The concepts of ‘ordre public’ and ‘morality’ found in Article 27.2 are not defined in the 
TRIPS Agreement. It is highly likely, however, that the meaning ascribed to the terms ‘public 
morals’ and ‘public order’ in Article XIV(a) of GATS and interpreted by the Panel in US—
Gambling would be of relevance when interpreting Article 27.2 of TRIPS. The Panel found 
that ‘public morals’ and ‘public order’: 
 
[C]an vary in time and space, depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing 
social, cultural, ethical and religious values.48 
 
According to the Panel: 
 
Members should be given some scope to define and apply for themselves the concepts of 
‘public morals’ and ‘public order’ in their respective territories, according to their own 
systems of scales and values.49 
 
The Panel referred to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary definition of the term ‘morals’ 
(‘habits of life with regard to right and wrong conduct’), and held that the term ‘public 
morals’ denotes: 
 
[S]tandards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or 
nation.50 
 
As for the term ‘public order’, the Panel in US—Gambling concluded that the dictionary 
definition of the term ‘order’, read together with footnote 5 of GATS Article XIV(a), 
suggests that ‘public order’ refers to: 
 
[T]he preservation of the fundamental interests of a society, as reflected in public policy 
and law. These fundamental interests can relate, inter alia, to standards of law, security and 
morality.51 
 
The Appellate Body did not disturb the Panel’s interpretation of the phrases ‘public morals’ 
and ‘public order’. Even though interpreting the term ‘public order’ in the same way as the 
term ‘ordre public’52 would render the drafters intention in using the French term in Article 
27.2 superfluous, there is nevertheless likely to be a degree of overlap between the meaning 
ascribed to these terms, as they seek to protect largely similar interests. 
    The definition of the term ‘commercial exploitation’ may be influenced by the meaning 
given to the phrase ‘exploitation of the patent’ found in Article 30 of TRIPS and understood 
                                                
47 Appellate Body Report, US—Gasoline, 16-17.  
48 Panel Report, US—Gambling, para. 6.461.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid, para 6.465. 
51 Ibid, para. 6.467. 
52 The EPO’s interpretation of ‘ordre public’, which it has stated as encompassing the protection of public 
security and the physical integrity of individuals as part of society, as well as the protection of the environment, 
may be influential in constructing this term in the context of TRIPS. Plant Genetic Systems [1995] EPOR 357 at 
para. 5. 
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by the Panel in Canada—Pharmaceuticals as relating to the ‘commercial activity’ by which 
patent owners ‘extract economic value’ from their invention.53  
    Unfortunately, the clarification of these individual terms casts fairly little light on the 
overarching question of which, if any, of the four views on the interpretation of Article 27.2, 
outlined above, would be adopted in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Nevertheless, a 
critique of the robustness of the ‘EPO morality jurisprudence view’ can be ventured simply 
on the basis of a comparison of the text of Article 27.2 of TRIPS with Article 53(a) EPC 
1973. Article 53(a) EPC 1973 states that European patents shall not be granted in respect of:  
 
[I]nventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to ‘ordre public’ or 
morality, provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely 
because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States’ 
(emphasis added). 
 
Article 27.2 of TRIPS, however, only authorises WTO Member States to exclude from 
patentability: ‘…inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial 
exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality’ (emphasis added). 
There are therefore two reasons for arguing that Article 27.2 should be interpreted in a way 
that is distinct to and narrower than Article 53(a) EPC 1973. First, Article 27.2 establishes a 
link between the denial of patentability and the necessity of the prevention of commercial 
exploitation, whereas the scope for excluding inventions under Article 53(a) EPC 1973 is 
broader; set instead to an expansive, ‘free-standing’ criterion that is not directly connected to 
the prevention of commercial exploitation. Second, the view that TRIPS Article 27.2 
provides a more restrictive rule than Article 53(a) EPC is supported by an analysis of the 
drafting history of Article 27.2,54 which reveals that negotiators first presented a text in 1990 
(W/76) that stated in Article 4: 
 
The following [shall] [may] be excluded from patentability: 
4.1 Inventions, [the publication or use of which would be], contrary to public order, [law,] 
[generally accepted standards of] morality, [public health,] [or the basic principle of human 
dignity] [or human values].55 
 
This was narrowed in the following ‘Brussels Draft’, which included an exception that would 
allow parties to exclude from patentability:             
 
[I]nventions, the prevention within their territory of the publication or any exploitation of 
which is necessary; to protect public morality or order, including to secure compliance with 
laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement; or to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health (emphasis added).56 
 
                                                
53 Panel Report, Canada—Pharmaceuticals, para 7.54. For discussion on whether the not-for profit manufacture 
and distribution of a product would amount to ‘commercial exploitation’, see C Henckels ‘The Ostensible 
“Flexibilities” in TRIPS: Can Essential Pharmaceuticals Be Excluded from Patentability in Public Health 
Crises’ at 347–348; E B Rodrigues Jr. and B Murphy ‘Brazil’s Prior Consent Law: A Dialogue Between Brazil 
and the United States Over Where the TRIPS Agreement Currently Sets the Balance Between the Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Medicines’ (2006) 16 Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology 
423-456. 
54 It is noted that analysis under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention must be completed before recourse may be 
had to the preparatory works of a treaty under Article 32. 
55 D Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 219.  
56 Ibid, 218.  
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The fact that the parties chose to delete the reference to ‘publication’ in the final draft of the 
TRIPS Agreement strengthens the view that Article 27.2 requires consideration of the 
prevention of the commercial exploitation of the invention for reasons of ordre public or 
morality, rather than of the consequences of the grant and publication of the patent.57 The 
textual differences between Article 27.2 of TRIPS and Article 53(a) EPC therefore suggest 
that the EPO’s ‘morality jurisprudence’ would be, at best, of very limited persuasive effect 
for a WTO panel or the Appellate Body. The remainder of this section will therefore only 
assess the remaining three views on the interpretation of Article 27.2, moving from textual 
analysis to consideration of its context, object and purpose. 
 
(3) Context and object and purpose 
 
There are several provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that would be of importance to the 
interpretation of Article 27.2 The Preamble and Article 1.1 of TRIPS demonstrate that the 
basic purpose of the Agreement is to reduce distortions and barriers to international trade by 
laying down minimum requirements for the protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. Other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement may also be of relevance in 
elucidating the meaning of Article 27.2. Articles 7 and 8.1 of TRIPS can be viewed as 
‘balancing provisions’ that enshrine the goal of achieving equilibrium between competing 
policy objectives. Article 7 provides that: 
 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, 
to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a 
manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations. 
 
Article 8.1 states that: 
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures 
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors 
of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that 
such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.  
In Canada—Pharmaceuticals, Canada asserted that the text of Article 7 declares that one of 
the key goals of the TRIPS Agreement is to strike a balance between the intellectual property 
rights created by the Agreement and other important socio-economic policies of WTO 
Member governments.58 Article 8.1 was said to elaborate further upon the socio-economic 
policies in question. It could be argued that these purposes call for an interpretation of TRIPS 
that would give WTO Members a reasonable degree of discretion to exclude inventions from 
patentability on grounds of ordre public or morality so that the obligation to make patents 
available in all fields of technology could be balanced against other important national 
policies. This assertion would, however, seem to be at odds with the Panel’s more nuanced 
interpretation of the influence of Articles 7 and 8.1 in Canada—Pharmaceuticals, where it 
was held that the exact scope of the provision under scrutiny (in that particular case Article 
30) would: 
                                                
57 R Rajnish Kumar ‘Patentable Subject Matter Requirements: An Evaluation of Proposed Exclusions to India’s 
Patent Law in Light of India’s Obligations Under the TRIPS Agreement and Options for India’ (2008) 8 
Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 41–84 at 66. 
58 Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Canada—Pharmaceutical Patents), 
WT/DS114/R (adopted 7 April 2000), para. 7.24. 
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[D]epend on the specific meaning given to its limiting conditions. The words of those 
conditions must be examined with particular care on this point. Both the goals and the 
limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8.1 must obviously be borne in mind when doing so as 
well as those of other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement which indicate its object and 
purposes.59 
 
On the basis of the Panel’s opinion in Canada—Pharmaceuticals, Articles 7 and 8.1 would 
be of relevance when construing the wording of Article 27.2,  but they would by no means 
act as ‘trump cards’ that would automatically lead to a flexible approach to the interpretation 
of the TRIPS morality exception.  
    Two other provisions within TRIPS must also be considered in order to understand the 
scope and contents of Article 27.2. First, Article 30 provides that: 
 
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, 
provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, 
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties. 
 
The Panel in Canada—Pharmaceuticals held that an exception to patent rights under Article 
30 must meet three cumulative requirements: first, the exception must be ‘limited’; second, it 
must not ‘unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent’; and third, it must 
not ‘unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner; taking account of the 
legitimate interests of third parties. It is important to point out that Article 30 relates to 
‘limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent’, and therefore deals with 
restrictions on exclusive rights conferred by patents that have already been granted, and not 
the issue of patentability per se under Article 27.1.60 Article 30 may, nevertheless, still 
inform the interpretation of Article 27.2, pointing to an approach whereby the 
‘reasonableness’ of measures excluding inventions from patentability would be scrutinised. 
    Second, and more importantly, it is clear that the object and purpose of Article 27.2 is to 
provide a limited exception to the obligation on WTO Members set out in Article 27.1. 
Article 27.2 must therefore be read in close conjunction with Article 27.1, with the text of the 
exception being informed by the wording of the rule to which it provides a limited 
derogation. Crucially, Article 27.1 states that ‘patents shall be available and patent rights 
enjoyable without discrimination as to the….field of technology’ (emphasis added). In 
Canada—Pharmaceuticals, the Panel considered whether the Canadian regulatory review 
provision discriminated as to the field of technology, namely pharmaceuticals, interpreting 
the term in the following way: 
 
The ordinary meaning of the word ‘discriminate’…certainly extends beyond the concept of 
differential treatment. It is a normative term, pejorative in connotation, referring to results 
of the unjustified imposition of differentially disadvantageous treatment. As noted above, 
de facto discrimination is a general term describing the legal conclusion that an ostensibly 
neutral measure transgresses a non-discrimination norm because its actual effect is to 
impose differentially disadvantageous consequences on certain parties, and because those 
measures are found to be wrong or unjustifiable.61 
 
                                                
59 Ibid, para. 7.26. 
60 R Rajnish Kumar ‘Patentable Subject Matter Requirements: An Evaluation of Proposed Exclusions to India’s 
Patent Law in Light of India’s Obligations Under the TRIPS Agreement and Options for India’ at 65. 
61 Panel Report, Canada—Pharmaceutical Patents, para. 7.94. 
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The meaning of Article 27.2 must therefore be shaped by the principle that the measures 
excluding an invention on the grounds of ordre public or morality must not be 
‘discriminatory’, in the sense of being ‘unjustified’, in nature.  
 
(4) Interpreting Article 27.2: The necessity of a ban on commercial exploitation 
 
How would the above discussion assist a panel or the Appellate Body in the interpretation of 
Article 27.2, particularly in relation to the three remaining academic views on the provisions 
scope and contents? When read in conjunction with Article 27.1 and Article 30, an exclusion 
of patentability on the grounds of ordre public or morality would only seem to be legitimate 
if it were ‘reasonable’, ‘justifiable’ and ‘non-discriminatory’. The specific wording used in 
Article 27.2 must be analysed and interpreted according to this framework of guiding 
principles. In addition, the drafting history of Article 27.2 suggests strongly that the common 
intention of the parties was to establish a central role for the prevention of the commercial 
exploitation of the invention in order to justify exclusions from patentability.  
    Upon consideration of these textual and contextual factors, it is suggested that the most 
reasonable and appropriate interpretation of Article 27.2 would be to require WTO Members 
to first prohibit the sale and distribution of an invention before excluding it from patentability 
on the grounds of ordre public or morality. It is extremely difficult to see how a WTO 
Member could argue convincingly that the prevention of the commercial exploitation of an 
invention in its territory was ‘necessary’ if it in fact permitted the commercial exploitation of 
that invention.62 Furthermore, options for interpreting Article 27.2 that would tolerate a 
mismatch between the standards of ordre public or morality expressed within a WTO 
Member’s patent laws and those expressed within the Member’s domestic regulations would 
contravene the principles of ‘reasonableness’, ‘justifiability’ and ‘non-discrimination’ that 
must be brought to bear on the construction of the provision. Finally, there are also strong 
policy reasons in support of the ‘necessity of a ban on commercial exploitation’ view. To 
permit Article 27.2 to be utilised in more flexible ways could open the floodgates to 
protectionism and free-riding. This would undermine the fundamental object and purpose of 
Article 27.1, and indeed of the entire TRIPS Agreement.  
 
(5) Counter-arguments  
 
Three counter-arguments in favour of alternative interpretations of Article 27.2 can be raised: 
 
(a) Acquiescence 
 
The first argument flows from the principle of ‘acquiescence’, which has been defined by a 
commentator in the following way: ‘[i]f a party has made plain its understanding of the 
meaning of a provision, and it later applies it in that sense without objection, other parties 
may not be able to insist on a different interpretation. Article 31:3(b) [of the Vienna 
Convention] might also apply’.63 The doctrine of acquiescence was accepted by the Panel in 
US—Gambling as being a valid guide to the interpretation of WTO Agreements.64 The 
practice of WTO Members in relation to the exclusion of certain inventions from 
                                                
62 K C Cheney ‘Patentability of Stem Cell Research under TRIPS: Can Morality-Based Exclusions be Better 
Defined by Emerging Customary International Law?’ (2007) 29 Loyola of Los Angeles International and 
Comparative Law Review’ 503–536 at 532. 
63 A Aust Modern Treaty Law and Practice, (Cambridge University Press 2000) 200. 
64 Panel Report, US—Gambling, para. 6.114 
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patentability on moral grounds in the years after the TRIPS Agreement came into force (i.e. 
after 1 January 1995) could therefore inform the interpretation of Article 27.2. 
  The sole case of potential relevance is a 1999 decision of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO), in which a patent application made by Stuart Newman and 
Jeremy Rifkin (Newman-Rifkin I) for combining human and nonhuman embryonic cells to 
develop a ‘humanoid’ chimera was rejected, even though the sale and distribution of the 
invention was not prohibited in the United States. A media advisory issued by the USPTO 
stated that amongst other reasons for the rejection of the patent: 
 
[I]nventions directed to human/ non-human chimera could, under certain circumstances, 
not be patentable because, among other things, they would fail to meet the public policy 
and morality aspects of the utility requirement.65 
 
As far as can be discerned, no WTO Members registered any objection to this decision or 
suggested that this approach might contravene Article 27.2 of TRIPS. It is, however, highly 
doubtful that the USPTO ruling in the Newman-Rifkin I application would be deemed to 
constitute ‘subsequent practice’ that would determine the interpretation of Article 27.2 of 
TRIPS. In Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II the Appellate Body referred to ‘practice’ within 
the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention as: 
 
[A] ‘concordant, common and consistent’ sequence of acts or pronouncements which is 
sufficient to establish a discernible pattern implying the agreement of the parties [to a 
treaty] regarding its interpretation.66 
Under this legal test, a single ruling by one WTO Member indicating a decision to exclude an 
invention from patentability whilst permitting the sale and distribution of the invention within 
its territory would not establish ‘practice’ indicating agreement amongst WTO Members on a 
particular interpretation of the TRIPS morality exception.  
 
(b) The distinction between legality and morality in TRIPS  
 
A second criticism of the ‘necessity of a ban on commercial exploitation’ view would be to 
restate the observation that Article 27.2 establishes quite clearly that an invention should not 
be excluded ‘merely’ on the grounds that it is prohibited by law or regulation. This suggests 
that the concepts of illegality and immorality ought to be regarded as separate and distinct 
within TRIPS. Arguably, if the illegal nature of a given invention is not determinative for the 
purposes of applying the morality exclusion, then neither should it be a necessary condition 
for excluding the patentability of inventions. This argument, however, breaks down under 
closer inspection. The sale and distribution of certain inventions might be prohibited by laws 
or regulations that reflect concerns of a more technical, as opposed to moral, nature.67 The 
final phrase of Article 27.2 simply reflects the idea that patentability should not be denied for 
this narrow category of inventions. Thus, even though it is beyond doubt that the exclusion of 
the exploitation of the invention is not a sufficient condition for exclusion of patentability 
                                                
65 USPTO ‘Facts on Patenting Life Forms having a Relationship to Humans’ (1998) Media Advisory No. 98-6. 
Available at: <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/98-06.htm>. See S Rabin ‘The Human Use of 
Humanoid Beings: Chimeras and Patent Law’ (2006) 24(5) Nature Biotechnology 517–519.  
66Appellate Body Report, Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, 11.   
67 This is in line with Article 4quater of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883, as 
revised), which states that: ‘[t]he grant of a patent shall not be invalidated on the ground that the sale of the 
patented product or of a product obtained by means of a patented process is subject to restrictions or limitations 
resulting from the domestic law’.  
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under Article 27.2, it does not follow logically that a ban on commercial exploitation can not 
be a necessary condition. 
 
(c) The appropriateness of a two-tier ‘necessity’ test 
 
A third counter-argument could be to suggest that a panel or the Appellate Body would not 
approach the interpretation of Article 27.2 by means of a simplistic, binary test to examine 
only whether the commercial exploitation of the invention had been prohibited within a 
WTO Member’s territory before a patent was denied on moral grounds. Instead, it has been 
suggested that the term ‘necessary’ in Article 27.2 would trigger a ‘reading in’ of the two-tier 
‘necessity test’ in accordance with WTO case law under GATT Article XX(b) and GATS 
Article XIV(a), perhaps using Article 30 of TRIPS as a ‘substitute chapeau’.68 At first glance 
this opinion seems reasonable, given the similarity between the structure and wording of the 
relevant exceptions in GATT, GATS and TRIPS. Furthermore, it may also be desirable from 
a policy perspective to permit a more fine-grained and flexible legal test for assessing the 
various measures and factual backgrounds that may prompt WTO Members to exclude 
inventions from patentability on the grounds of ordre public or morality. There are some 
practical problems with this view.  
    If a WTO Member believes that a class of inventions poses a genuine threat to ordre 
public or morality, and if appropriate regulatory measures are reasonably available for the 
Member to prevent the commercial exploitation of the inventions but these measures are not 
adopted, then the denial of patent protection in such circumstances could never be deemed to 
be ‘necessary’. As Correa observes:  
 
Generally, patent offices have no power to prevent the commercialization of a product. The 
refusal of protection, on the other hand, does not necessarily lead to the exclusion of 
commercialization.69 
 
The exclusion from patentability could therefore not make a significant contribution to the 
aim of preventing the sale and distribution of the inventions within the WTO Member’s 
territory. A two-tier ‘necessity’ test would therefore be a wholly redundant and meaningless 
exercise in the context of Article 27.2, as the outcome of the test would be a foregone 
conclusion if the commercialisation of the invention had not also been prohibited.70  
    The term ‘necessary’ in Article 27.2 must therefore refer to the necessity of preventing the 
commercial exploitation of the invention, rather than the necessity of excluding the invention 
from patentability. Whilst this may seem to be a subtle distinction, the implication is that any 
weighing and balancing of the necessity of the prevention of the sale and distribution of the 
invention would need to be conducted under Article XX of GATT or relevant provisions in 
other WTO Agreements.71 This reinforces the view that Article 27.2 would only countenance 
exclusions from patentability if the WTO Member has first banned the commercial 
exploitation of the invention on the grounds of ordre public or morality.  
 
                                                
68 D Gervais The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 223. Also discussed in C Henckels ‘The 
Ostensible Flexibilities in TRIPS: Can Essential Pharmaceuticals Be Excluded from Patentability in Public 
Health Crises?’ at 349-350. 
69 C M Correa and A A Yusuf Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement, (Kluwer 
Law International 1998) 193.  
70 R Rajnish Kumar ‘Patentable Subject Matter Requirements: An Evaluation of Proposed Exclusions to India’s 
Patent Law in Light of India’s Obligations Under the TRIPS Agreement and Options for India’ 68. 
71 For example, the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the ‘SPS 
Agreement’) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the ‘TBT Agreement’).  
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(6) A legal test for Article 27.2 of TRIPS 
 
Analysis of the text, context and object and purpose of Article 27.2 of TRIPS suggests that it 
should be interpreted by means of a binary test that would focus on the question of whether 
or not a ban on the sale or distribution of the invention is in force within the territory of the 
WTO Member. This kind of binary approach was adopted in a slightly different context by 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Conegate v Customs and Excise Commissioners.72 
This case concerned the seizure of life-size, inflatable dolls and other materials by United 
Kingdom customs officers on the grounds that the items were ‘indecent and obscene’ within 
the meaning of English customs legislation.73 The ECJ found the seizure to be unjustified 
because the restrictions within the UK placed on the domestic goods did not amount to a 
prohibition on manufacture or sale. When assessing the consistency of the domestic measures 
with the import ban, the ECJ held that: 
 
[I]t must be at least possible to conclude from the applicable rules, taken as a whole, that 
their purpose is, in substance, to prohibit the manufacture and marketing of those 
products.74 
 
The following sections suggest how a Conegate-type test for assessing domestic regulations 
might be applied in relation to the moral restrictions on the patentability of hESC-related 
inventions in Europe. 
 
(a) Article 6.2(c) of the EU Biotechnology Directive 
 
Article 6.2(c) of the EU Biotechnology Directive, which prohibits the patenting of ‘uses of 
human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes’ in all EU Member States, would fail 
to meet the requisite standard.75 This is because it is not possible to conclude from an 
examination of the applicable rules regarding ‘uses of human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes’ across EU Member States, that taken as a whole, these rules prohibit 
the manufacture and marketing of such goods throughout the EU.76 
  Article 6.2(c) of the EU Biotechnology Directive has also been transposed into the domestic 
patent laws of all EU Member States. Under the same approach, the domestic patent laws of 
the individual EU Member States that have not banned the sale and distribution of goods 
relating to the use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes would also fail a 
Conegate-type test. By the same token, the individual EU Member States that do actually 
maintain effective prohibitions on the sale and distribution of ‘uses of human embryos for 
industrial or commercial purposes’ (e.g. Austria77) would be entitled to exclude related 
inventions from patentability under Article 27.2 of TRIPS. 
 
(b) Morality and the EPC framework 
 
                                                
72 Conegate v Customs and Excise Commissioners (Case 121/85) [1986] ECR 1007, [1986] 1 CMLR 739, 
European Court of Justice. 
73 See E Berry, S Hargreaves and E Deards European Union Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press 2007) 175. 
74 Conegate v Customs and Excise Commissioners, 17. 
75 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions (1998) OJ L213/13. 
76 See generally A Elstner et al. ‘The Changing Landscape of European and International Regulation on 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research’. 
77 Austrian Reproductive Medicine Act (1992). 
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The centralised patent application system under the EPC presents further questions.78 Rule 
28(c) transposes Article 6.2(c) of the Biotechnology Directive into the EPC framework, and 
thus imposes a blanket ban on the issuance of patents relating to ‘industrial or commercial 
uses of the human embryo’ by the EPO, regardless of whether the marketing and 
manufacture is authorised in the individual EPC states selected by the patent applicant. It is 
suggested that the blanket rule of Rule 28(c) would likely be held to be unacceptable. 
Alternative institutional arrangements that allowed patents to be granted for the EPC 
countries that permit the sale and distribution of inventions relating to ‘uses of the human 
embryo for industrial or commercial purposes’, whilst preventing the granting of patents for 
any EPC states that have effective bans on the commercial exploitation of these inventions 
would, however, be permitted under a Conegate-type approach to Article 27.2.  
 
(c) Prohibitions on the preliminary steps of manufacture 
 
Additional complexities are raised by the scenario whereby bans are in place on the 
preliminary steps of the manufacture of an invention, but where the sale and distribution of 
the completed article is lawful within a WTO Member’s territory. In Germany, for example, 
the Stem Cell Act prohibits the derivation of hESC within Germany, but licences to import 
hESC lines created outside Germany can be applied for on a case-by-case basis. Only hESC 
lines that were created before 1 May 2007 and were derived from surplus embryos left over 
from in vitro fertilisation procedures can be imported.79 Would the prohibition only on the 
derivation of hESC lines within Germany permit a general exclusion on the patentability of 
all aspects and applications of hESC-technology?80 There are two possible approaches.  
    First, a WTO panel or the Appellate Body could take a deferential stance towards the 
Member’s political decision to ban the preliminary steps of manufacturing the invention 
within its territory. Under this approach, the WTO Member would be entitled to prohibit 
patent applications that pertain directly to the ‘immoral’ preliminary steps and also to 
applications pertaining to the completed invention and its use, even though the completed 
article can lawfully be sold and distributed within that Member’s territory. Alternatively, the 
stricter view would emphasise the desirability of removing trade distortions and therefore 
require a WTO Member to prohibit not only the preliminary steps of making the invention 
but also the sale and distribution of the completed article before it could justify the exclusion 
of the entire class of technology from patentability.  
    It is suggested that the second, stricter option is to be preferred. Requiring WTO Members 
to grant patents for inventions that can lawfully be sold and distributed within their territory 
following the completion of the preliminary steps of their manufacture would in no way alter 
or compromise the legal prohibition on conducting those early steps within the Member’s 
territory. The stricter approach would also prevent the problem of WTO Members gaining an 
unfair competitive advantage by allowing domestic researchers to free-ride on the efforts and 
investment of foreign inventors. 
 
                                                
78 For an overview of the centralised system for the grant of ‘European patents’ under the EPC framework, see L 
Bently and B Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, 3rd edn (Oxford University Press 2009) 341–342. 
79 A Elstner et al. ‘The Changing Landscape of European and International Regulation on Embryonic Stem Cell 
Research’, 104–105. Italy and the Republic of Ireland have also implemented similar regimes. ‘UCC to Allow 
Controversial Stem Cell Research’ (2008) Centre for Ageing Research and Development in Ireland. Available 
at: <http://www.cardi.ie/news/ucctoallowcontroversialstemcellresearch>. 
80 In December 2006, the German Federal Patent Court revoked a patent issued to neurobiologist Oliver Brüstle 
on a method of generating neural precursor cells on the grounds that the cells involved the destruction of human 
embryos and therefore breached guidelines issued by the German Patent Office. See A Abbott ‘Stem Cell 
Technique “Contrary to Public Order”’ (2006) 444 Nature 799.  
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(7) TRIPS Article 27.3(b): The exclusion of ‘animals’ from patentability 
 
On a final note, Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS provides that Members may exclude from 
patentability: 
[P]lants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for 
the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological 
processes.  
In contrast to Article 27.2, Article 27.3(b) does not establish any requirement to prohibit the 
sale and distribution of inventions that fall within its scope before excluding them from 
patentability. If the term ‘animals’ could be construed broadly to encompass homo sapiens, 
then WTO Members would be permitted to deny patents for inventions relating to ‘humans’ 
or ‘essentially biological processes’ for their production without the need to also prevent the 
commercial exploitation of such inventions. On this basis, it could be argued that patents 
claiming human totipotent cells, which have the potential to develop into an entire human 
body, could be excluded from patentability on the grounds that they contain claims directed 
towards an ‘animal in development’.81 Embryonic, multipotent and pluripotent cells, which 
do not have the potential to develop into an entire human body, would fall outside the scope 
of this rule and could not be excluded from patentability under Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS. 
Conclusion 
 
Notions of ‘morality’ may differ greatly amongst WTO Members. What is acceptable in one 
country may be seen as offensive or injurious to prevailing moral standards in another. This 
chapter has asserted that although a degree of scope is afforded to WTO Members to exclude 
goods and services from their territory in order to protect ‘public morals’ by virtue of GATT 
Article XX and GATS Article XIV, Article 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement is likely to be 
interpreted and applied in a more restrictive fashion.    
The chapter has argued that as the text of Article 27.2 must be analysed closely and read in 
conjunction with Article 27.1 and Article 30, the most reasonable understanding of Article 
27.2 is that put forward by Van Den Bossche and others.82 Under this interpretation, a WTO 
Member must first prevent the commercial exploitation of the invention within its territory in 
order to legitimately exclude the invention from patentability. Failure to do so will mean that 
it cannot rely on Article 27.2 to justify deviating from its core obligation under Article 27.1 
to make patents available without ‘discrimination’ as to the field of technology. Under this 
understanding of Article 27.2, the bulk of the measures restricting the patentability of hESC 
technology in Europe would not be TRIPS-compatible. Even so, it may be possible to 
exclude totipotent cells from patentability under Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS without any need 
for a WTO Member to prohibit the sale and distribution of these cells within its territory.  
                                                
81 See UK Intellectual Property Office, Practice Notice ‘Inventions Involving Human Embryonic Stem Cells’ (3 
February 2009). The Practice Notice states that: ‘Human totipotent cells have the potential to develop into an 
entire human body. In view of this potential, such cells are not patentable because the human body at the various 
stages of its formation and development is excluded from patentability’. Available at: 
<http://www.ipo.gov.uk/pro-types/pro-patent/p-law/p-pn/p-pn-stemcells-20090203.htm>. For a forceful critique 
of this approach in the Canadian context, see G R Hagen ‘Potency, Patenting and Preformation: The 
Patentability of Totipotent Cells in Canada’ (2008) 5(3) SCRIPTed 515–552.  
82 P Van Den Bossche The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, 785. 
